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JUDICIAL SELECTION AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
JONATHAN L. ENTIN• 
The 2000 election campaign for the seat- held by Ohio Supreme Court 
Justice Alice Robie Resnick was by far the most contentious in the Buckeye 
State's history. Justice Resnick, part of the four-member majority on a court 
that had decided a number of high-stakes cases, was targeted for defeat by 
business groups, notably the state and national Chambers of Commerce. • 
Millions of dollars poured into the campaign, much of it devoted to television 
advertisements accusing Justice Resnick of selling her judicial vote to trial 
lawyers and labor unions.2 The tone of the campaign was so vitriolic that Chief 
Justice Thomas J. Moyer, who regularly dissented from the controversial 
rulings, urged disclosure of advertising sponsors in the future and the adoption 
of an appointive system in place of judicial elections.3 The Ohio campaign was 
the latest in a series of highly contentious state judicial elections in recent 
years.• For example, in 1986 California's Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of 
her colleagues were ousted after a campaign that focused on the trio's 
decisions in death penalty cases.~ Then in 1996, Nebraska Chief Justice David 
Copyriglll «:1 2001. Jonothnn L Emin. 
Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. My 
father's fin~ illness prevented me from delivering this paper in person at the Capital University 
Law School symposium on judicial selection in January 200 I. My deepest gratitude goes to the 
editors who have permitted me to participate vicariously in the proceedings. 
1 T.C. Brown, 2 Campaigns for Top Court Exceed $6 Million: Spending, Auack Ads 
Some of Worst in Coumry, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 27,2000, at Bl. 
2 /d.; William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts,N. Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at AI. One advertisement that aired repeatedly showed the traditional 
scales of justice with a voice-over saying, "Is justice for sale in Ohio?" James Bradshaw, Ad 
Signals Tough Fight for Ohio Supreme Court Seat, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2000, at C6; 
Spencer Hunt, Campaign 2000-TV Ads Help Mold Supreme Coun Race, CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 
22, 2000, at B I; Sandy Theis. Controversial Ad Becomes Issue in Court Race, PLAIN DEALER, 
Oct. 21,2000, at5B. 
3 James Bradshaw, Select, Don't Elect, Moyer Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 
2000. at 86; T.C. Brown, Moyer Urges Appointing of Top Court, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10, 
2000, at B I; T.C. Brown, Top Judge Wants Ad Campaign Backers Identified, PLAIN DEALER, 
Dec. 12,2000, at B5; Spencer Hunt, Campaign Secrecy to Face Attack, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 
12, 2000, at B I; Spencer Hunt, Chief Justice; Appoint Judges, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 10,2000, 
at Cl. 
4 Glaberson, supra note 2, at A I. 
5 See generally PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD AND 
TilE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT {1981); see also RobertS. Thompson, Judicial Retention 
Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of /986, 
(continued) 
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Lanphier lost his seat after writing a unanimous opinion that invalidated a 
term-limits amendment to the state constitution," and Justice Penny White of 
the Tennessee Supreme Court was defeated largely on the basis of her joining 
an opinion overturning the death penalty in a notorious rape and murder case. 7 
Meanwhile, Alabama has had a series of tumultuous supreme court election 
campaigns over the past decade.• In short, the Resnick campaign reflected the 
increasing involvement of interest groups in judicial elections and the 
escalation of the cost of those elections.• Chief Justice Moyer's reform 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988). 
6 Duggan v. Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994} (holding-that sponsors of the 
amendment, which had been approved in the 1992 general election, submitted an insufficient 
number of valid signatures on their initiative petition so the amendment was void). Opposition 
to Lanphier also arose from several rulings overturning second-degree murder convictions. 
Tracie! V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices 
Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70-71 (1999}. 
7 State v. Odom, 928 S. W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). The court unanimously concluded that 
errors during the trial's penalty phase required a new sentencing hearing, id. at 32-33, although 
two of the five justices based their conclusion on narrower grounds than did the majority./d. at 
33-35 (Anderson, C.J., joined by Drowota, J., concurring and dissenting). On the sources of 
opposition to Justice White, see Reid, supra note 6, at 70. 
8 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Elections: A Case Study 
of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & PoL. 645,656-61 (1999}. The 1994 election for 
chief justice was not decided for nearly a year due to a dispute over counting absentee ballots. 
Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995). In 2000, the voters chose Roy Moore as their 
new chief justice. Other Races itzthe South: "Ten Commandments Judge" Elected to Lead 
Alabama High Court, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., Nov. 8, 2000, at E12. Moore was a trial judge 
who gained notoriety by displaying the Ten Commandments in his courtroom. /d. When his 
display prompted litigation, the Governor threatened to call out the National Guard to keep the 
Ten Commandments on view, but the legal dispute ended inconclusively. See Ala. Freethought 
Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995)(concludingthattheplaintiffschallenging 
Judge Moore's display of the Ten Commandments lacked standing); Ex parte Moore, 773 So. 
2d 437(Aia. 2000) (per curiam) (dismissing as moot Judge Moore's challenge to the Alabama 
Judicial Inquiry Commission's investigation relating to the controversy over his display of the 
Ten Commandments in his courtroom); Ex parte State ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So. 2d 952 
(Ala. 1998) (finding the dispute over Judge Moore's display of the Ten Commandments to be 
nonjusticiable); cf Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that 
courtroom display of the Ten Commandments violates the Establishment Clause), affd, 15 
F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). Chief Justice Moore recently had a 
massive sculpture containing the Ten C~mmandments installed in the rotunda of the Alabama 
Supreme Court building. Jeffrey Gettleman, Conviction Cast in Stone, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2001, at A9; Dahleen Glanton, Judge Unveils Bible-Based Monument, CHI. TRJB., Aug. 16, 
2001, at I. 
9 See generally Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LoY. 
(continued) 
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proposals mirror ideas that have received nationwide support. 10 
This article examines the background to the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court 
election and suggests that the contention surrounding Justice Resnick's 
reelection bid arose less from the state's method of choosing judges than from 
a political culture that places substantial weight on judicial philosophy and 
case outcomes. If legal doctrine is politically salient, those who care about the 
law will seek to influence the composition of the judiciary. This in tum 
counsels against unrealistic expectations about refonn of the judicial selection 
process. Things may improve at the margin, but the most likely check on the 
worst excesses might well be the difficulty of sustaining a slash-and-bum 
political strategy at least in the-judicial context. After all, Justice Resnick did 
win despite the heavy artillery she faced last year} 1 
This article proceeds in four stages. Part I examines the major rulings, 
relating to tort refonn and school funding, that prompted the harsh and 
expensive Ohio campaign. Part n compares the process for appointing federal 
judges, particularly Supreme Court justices, which has also become notably 
contentious over the past three decades. Part III discusses the trend away from 
strict limitations on campaign speech by judicial candidates, which combined 
with the expansive protections afforded to independent expenditures in 
election campaigns will facilitate sharp rhetoric by those inclined in that 
direction. Finally, Part IV assesses the prospects for elevating the level of 
discourse in judicial selection. 
I. THE UNDERLYING ISSUES IN THE 2000 OHIO SUPREME COURT 
ELECTION 
Two major issues galvanized interest group involvement in· Justice 
Resnick's reelection campaign. 12 One was tort refonn, the other school 
funding. 1' During the year preceding the November 2000 election, Resnick 
wrote the majority opinion in important cases dealing with both subjects.'" 
Both times the Ohio Supreme Court was divided four to three so that electoral 
L.A. L. REV. 1391 (2001); Glaberson, supra note 2. 
10 William Glaberson, A Bipartisan Effort to Remove Politics from Judicial Races, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A 18; William Glaberson, Justices Urge Stricter Rules for Judicial 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A 16; William Glaberso'n, Lawyers' Study Says States 
Should Pay for Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 200 I, at A 10; William Glaberson, States 
Taking Steps to Rein In Excesses of Judicial Politicking, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,2001, at AI. 
11 James Bradshaw, High Court Unchanged Despite Negative TV Ads, COLUMBUS 
D1SPA TCH, Nov. 8, 2000, at A I. 
12 Ken McCall, Resnick Preparing for Fight of Her Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 27, 
2000, at AI. 
13 /d. 
14 DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
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fate might well have determined the direction of legal doctrine in the state on 
these and similar issues.'' This section examines Justice Resnick's opinions in 
the high-profile cases that became the focus of the campaign debate. Although 
those opinions were open to criticism, her most strident opponents in the 
business community obscured the real analytical difficulties in ways that 
helped her galvanize support and win reelection. 
A. Tort Reform 
Between 1975 and 1987, the Ohio General Assembly enacted several 
measures designed to make it more difficult for tort plaintiffs to recover and 
limiting how much they could receive.'• Beginning in 1986, the Ohio Supreme 
Court invalidated some of the central provisions of the new laws for violating 
the state constitution. 
Many of these rulings concerned the time within which medical 
malpractice actions must be filed The legislature set a one-year statute of 
limitations accompanied by a four-year statute of repose.'7 This meant that all 
malpractice claims had to be brought within one year after the plaintiff 
discovered the injury, but in any event within four years of the occurrence of 
the alleged malpractice.'" The court incrementally gutted these requirements in 
a series of rulings.,. First to go was the statute of repose as applied to minors 
below the age of ten.2" The malpractice law tolled the time limits for only four 
years. 21 This would prevent a child injured before her tenth birthday from 
suing in her own right because the four-year statute of repose would expire 
before she turned eighteen.22 Denying the right to sue contravened the due 
course of law provision of the Ohio Constitution.23 Soon afterward the court 
rejected the statute of repose as applied to plaintiffs who did not discover their 
injuries within the four-year deadline.,. This restriction contravened the state 
15 Justice Deborah L. Cook, who dissented in the contentious cases, was also up for 
reelection but was generally expected to win another term. William Glaberson, A Spirited 
Campaign for Ohio Court Puts Judges on New Terrain, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at A 15. 
16 The most important of these were the Ohio Medical Malpractice Act, 1975 Ohio 
Laws 2809, and the Tort Reform Act of 1987, 1987 Ohio Laws 1661. 
17 Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717,719-20 (Ohio 1986). 
18 /d. 
19 /d.; Hardy v. Vermenlen, 512 N.E.2d 626(0hio 1987); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, 
Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987). 
20 Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at syl. 
21 /d. at 721. 
22 ld. Although the state had a disability statute that tolls the statute of limitations for 
minors, this statute did not apply to malpractice claims. ld. 
23 /d. at 722; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
24 Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at syl. 
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constitutional right to remedy for personal injury.25 Next came a ruling 
striking down the statute of repose as applied to a plaintiff who discovered her 
injury in the fourth year after the occurrence of the alleged malpractice.26 
Enforcing the statute of repose would give such a plaintiff less than one full 
year to prepare her case before filing suit, but the one-year· statute of 
limitations showed that the legislature intended malpractice plaintiffs to have 
that long to go to court.21 The statutory distinction between those claimants 
who discovered their medical injuries in time to file within one year and those 
who discovered their medical injuries less than a year before the expiration of 
the statute of repose violated the state constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection because there was no rational basis for the distinction." 
Other procedural restrictions met a similar fate based on the separation of 
powers.29 First down was a statutory ban on including a specific amount of 
damages in the complaint when the plaintiff sought more than $25,000.30 This 
ban conflicted with a procedural rule promulgated by the court that required 
plaintiffs to specify the amount of damages they sought.31 Because the state 
constitution empowered the supreme court to "prescribe rules governing 
practice and procedure in all courts,"32 the procedural rule trumped an 
inconsistent statute.33 The same reasoning led to the demise of an additional 
pleading requirement for malpractice plaintiffs.34 The malpractice statute 
mandated that complaints document that the plaintiff or her lawyer had sought 
to examine or copy the patient's medical records before filing suit.35 This 
statutory requirement conflicted With another procedural rule that contained no 
provision for affidavits or other verification in malpractice pleadings, so the 
inconsistent statute had to fall. 36 
25 /d. at629. 
26 Gaines v. Preterm-Cieveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, syl. (Ohio 1987). 
27 /d. at 714. 
28 /d. at 714-15; OHIO CaNST. art I, §2. The court added that affording malpractice 
claimants less than a full year to sue after discovering their injuries violated the open courts 
provision. 514 N.E.2d at716; OHIOCONST. art. I, §16. 
29 Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994); Rockey v. 84 Lumber 
Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993). 
30 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at syl. The statutory provision applied to all tort actions, not 
only to malpractiCe claims. /d. at 790. Although Rockey was an ordinary personal injury suit, 
two of the consolidated cases challenging the provision involved medical malpractice claims. 
/d. at 789, 792-93. 
31 /d. at 791-92. 
32 OHIOCONST. art. IV,§ 5(B). 
33 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 792. 
34 Hiall, 626 N.E.2d at syl. 
35 /d. at 72-73. 
36 /d. at 73. 
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The legislature did not confine itself to procedural barriers. 3' The 
malpractice statute also imposed restrictions on damages, but the court did 
away with those as well.3" The ceiling of $200,000 on general damages was 
first to go.3• Although the cap was promoted as a way to address the crisis in 
medical malpractice insurance, the majority found no rational connection 
between general damage awards and malpractice insurance rates.'" 
Accordingly, the cap violated the Ohio constitutional guarantee of due process· 
of laW.41 Then came a ruling that overturned a provision requiring that 
malpractice damages in excess of $200,000 be paid periodically rather than in 
a lump sum.42 This requirement could result in a successful plaintiffs receiving 
less than the full amount of the verdict, which violated the state constitutional 
right to a jury trial. 43 
The court took a similarly skeptical view of tort reform in general." Having 
effectively dispatched the malpractice statute of repose, the justices struck 
down a ten-year statute of repose for architects and engineers. 45 That deadline 
could prevent persons injured as a result of negligent design or construction 
from obtaining relief from those responsible for their injuries and therefore 
violated Ohio's constitutional right to remedy:• This ruling relied heavily on 
an earlier decision invalidating a two-year statute of limitations for plaintiffs 
exposed to diethylstilbestrol (DES)." That case involved a provision that 
triggered the statute of limitations when a woman learned from a physician that 
37 SeeGalayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644_N.E.2d.298 (Ohio 1994); Morris v. Savoy, 
576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991). 
38 /d. 
39 Morris, 576 N.E.2d at syl. 
40 See id. at 770. 
41 /d. at 771; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. The lead opinion, which was joined by three of 
the six participating justices, also expressed concern that "the statute treat[ed] the most 
seriously injured malpractice victims differently from the rest of the class [of malpractice 
victims]," but concluded that the distinction passed equal protection muster under the most 
deferential standard of review. /d. at 772. Two other justices thought that the damage cap 
violated several state constitutional provisions, including the equal protection guarantee. /d. at 
777, 778-80, 781-83 (Sweeney, J., joined by Resnick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
42 Galayda, 644 N.E.2d at syl. 
43 • /d. at 301-02; OHIO CONST. art. I, §5. The periodic payment requirement also 
violated the due course of law guarantee. 644 N.E.2d at 302; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. 
44 See Adamsky v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist., 653 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1995); Brennaman 
v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994); see also Cyrus v. Henes, 640 N.E.2d 810 (Ohio 
1994). 
45 Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at syl. 
46 639 N.E.2d at 430; OHIOCONST. art. I,§ 16. 
47 639 N.E.2d at 430-31. 
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she had an injury "which may be related" to her exposure to DES during her 
mother's pregnancy:•~ Relying on the earlier decisions against unduly 
restrictive time limits for filing medical malpractice actions, the majority 
concluded that the DES time limit violated the right to remedy and due process 
clauses of the Ohio Constitution:•. The court also held that a two-year statute 
of limitations for personal injury claims against political subdivisions of the 
state could not be applied to minors.50 The law authorizing suits against 
governmental entities contained no tolling provision. 51 This meant that adults 
would have two years to file suit; children might never have a chance to do so 
because minors may not pursue claims in court. 52 Accordingly, the two-year 
limitation violated the state equal protection clause and could not bar a minor's 
suit.5) . -
Other restrictions met a similar fate. For example, an effort to limit all 
claims by employees against their employers to worker's compensation 
proceedings was held unconstitutional.54 Employee claims involving 
intentional torts were not subject to worker's compensation because they arose 
outside the employment relationship. 55 Accordingly, the legislature could not 
include such claims in worker's compensation .proceedings.56 Addressing a 
more general restriction, the court invalidated a statute that empowered the 
trial judge to determine the amount of pUnitive damages to be awarded if the 
jury decided that such damages were appropriate. 57 Because fixing the amount 
of punitive damages was a traditional jury function, the statute infringed a 
plaintiffs right to a jury trial.5' Similarly, the court rejected a legislative effort 
to repeal the collateral source rule, under which insurance payments and other 
benefits do not affect the amount of damages awarded in a tort actio!!. s• Doing 
away with the collateral source rule, the majority reasoned, violated ~everal 
provisions of the Ohio Constitution: the right to jury trial, because a deduction 
for collateral benefits was required even if the collateral payments did not 
48 Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co:, 609N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ohio 1993). 
49 ld. at 141-43. 
50 Adamsky v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist., 6S3 N.E.2d 212, syl. (Ohio 1995). 
51 /d.at213. 
52 /d. at214. 
53 /d. at 215; 0HIOCONST. art. I, §2. 
54 Brady v. Safety-Kieen Corp., 576 N.E.2d722, syl. (Ohio 1991). 
55 /d. at 729. In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion quoted extensively from 
the dissenting opinion in Taylor v. Acad.Jron & Metai Co., 522 N.E.2d 464, 476 (Ohio 1988) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
56 576 N.E.2d at 728-29; OHIO CONST. art. II, §35. 
57 Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, syl. (Ohio 1994). 
58 /d. at 401; OHIO CONST. art. I, §5. 
59 Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, syl. (Ohio 1994); see also Depew v. Ogella, 635 
N.E.2d 310 (Ohio 1994); May v. Tandy Corp., 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994). 
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compensate for any injury covered by the jury award;•o the right to due course 
(or due process) of law, because the elimination of the collateral source rule 
did not further a compelling interest in promoting access to affordable 
insurance or eliminating double recoveries;•• the guarantee of equal protection 
of the Jaws, because jury awards in medical malpractice cases were subject to a 
different collateral source rule than were jury awards in all other tort cases;•> 
and the right to remedy and open courts, because the repeal of the collateral 
source rule could deprive some plaintiffs of their entire jury award.63 
Two points about these rulings bear emphasis. One is that reasonable legal 
minds could differ about the issues in these cases. Few of these decisions were 
unanimous,•• but only three reflected the four to three split that has 
characterized the Ohio Supreme Court in recent years.•s The possibility of 
legitimate disagreement means that the direction of tort law could be an 
acceptable issue in judicial selection. 
The other is that the court's opinions are not especially well reasoned.•• To 
take just one example, one can focus on Sorrell v. Thevenir, the case that 
struck down the repeal of the collateral source rule. 67 The majority opinion 
never addressed the fundamental issues that have made the rule controversial. 
60 Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510. 
61 /d.at51l. 
62 /d.at512-13. 
63 /d.at513. 
64 In two non-unanimous cases, there were no dissenting opinions; the justices who 
disagreed simply noted their dissent. Hiatt v. So. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71, 73 
(Ohio 1994) (Wright & Pfeifer, JJ., dissenting); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140, 
144 (Ohio 1993) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
65 The only four to three decisions in this series of cases were Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 
639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio l994),Brady v. Safety-Kleen Co., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991), and 
Hardy v. Vermenlan, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987). Despite the disagreement among the 
justices in Hardy, the result was unanimous. See Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at 632 n.l2 (Wright, J., 
joined by Markus & Holmes, JJ., concurring in judgment only and dissenting in part). Three 
justices dissented insofar as the case invalidated the four-year statute of repose in medical 
malpractice actions. /d. They agreed, however, that this time limit could not constitutionally 
be applied to the plaintiff because the alleged malpractice occurred before the effective date of 
the statute. /d. 
66 This problem is not confined to tort cases. A notable example from a very different 
context is State v. Lessin, 620 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio 1993), a four to three ruling that set aside a 
conviction for incitement to violence arising from the burning of an American flag during an 
antiwar demonstration. The decision was based on inadequate jury instructions. /d. at syl. 
Both the majority opinion and the dissenters missed the fundamental constitutional issues in 
the case. See Jonathan L. Entin, Right, Wrong in Lessin Decision, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 3, 1993, 
at B7. 
67 633 N.E.2d 504, syl. (Ohio 1994). 
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The rule prohibits consideration of collateral payments, such as insurance 
benefits, in awarding damages.68 Those who emphasize compensation as the 
primary goal of tort law regard the collateral source rule as an anachronism 
because it enables plaintiffs to obtain a windfall: tort damages that come on top 
of compensation received from other sources.6• Supporters of the rule believe 
it furthers the goatof punishing wrongdoers by requiring them to pay the full 
amount of damages they have caused.7" Both compensation and punishment 
are fundamental purposes of tort law.7' The Sorrell Court never acknowledged 
the tension between these purposes, but simply proceeded to treat the rule as 
encompassed by various fundamental rights protected by the Ohio 
Constitution.12 This was especially peculiar in lightpfthe~eocy oftherule's 
explicit adoption in Ohio and the entire absence of references to the state 
constitution in the case that endorsed the rule.13 Moreover, the majority 
opinion raised serious doubts about the continuing vitality of the three-year-old 
ruling upholding the statutory abrogation of the collateral source rule in 
medical malpractice cases.14 At the same time, the dissenters offered an 
incomplete analysis. They asserted that "the underlying purpose of tort law is 
to wholly compensate victims" without addressing tort law's punitive goal or· 
explaining why they regarded compensation as primary.75 
Whatever the merits of the Ohio Supreme Court's approach to these 
issues, the General Assembly entered the fray with a comprehensive 1996 
statute that purported to overturn many of the court's decisions and to enact 
68 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 920 cmt. e (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF. TORTS§ 
920A(2) & cmts. b-e (1979). 
69 E.g., John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 
54 CAL. L. REV. 1478 (1966). 
10 E.g., Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. 
L. REV. 523,528-31 (1991). 
71 RESTATEMENTOFTORTS § 901(a), (c) (1939); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 
901 (a), (c) ( 1979). 
12 Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510-13. The court's failure to address the view that "[t]he 
collateral-source rule is of common law origin and can· be changed by statute," RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. d (1979), is understandable, however. Any statutory change 
in the rule must, of course, comport with constitutional requirements. 
73 The majority opinion observes that the rule was "adopted" in Pryor v. Webber, 263 
N .E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970). Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 509. The Pryor court ~ited Ohio cases dating 
back a century in support of its explicit endorsement of the .collateral source rule. Pryor, 263 
N.E.2d at 238 (citing Klein v. Thompson, 19 Ohio St. 569 (1869)). 
74 Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 512 (discussing Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765,772 (Ohio 
1991 )). Indeed, the Sorrell majority reasoned that the different statutory approaches to the 
collateral source rule in the malpractice and general tort contexts violated Ohio's constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection. /d. 
75 /d. at 514 (Moyer, C.J. joined by Wright, J., dissenting). 
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numerous other tort reforms.'6 Trial lawyers and organized labor filed an 
original action in the supreme court challenging the measure's 
constitutionality. In State ex ref. Ohio Academy ofTrial Lawyers v. Sheward,71 
the court struck down the entire statute by a four to three vote." Justice 
Resnick wrote the majority opinion.'• The opinion is remarkable both in its 
organization and in its tone, both of which provided ample fodder for critics. •o 
The most striking organizational feature was the final section, Part VII, a nine-
page rebuttal to the dissenters' principal arguments, which followed what was 
labeled as the conclusion in Part VI."' By choosing this form of comeback, 
Justice Resnick might have given more credence than necessary to the 
dissenters' views. She might have blunted their criticisms more effectively by 
incorporating her responses directly into her own discussion, particularly in 
footnotes, rather than elevating them to additional prominence as the final 
portion of her opinion. "2 
Beyond its structure, the opinion raised questions of substance. For 
example, Part ill concluded that the challengers, who were seeking to 
vindicate public rights, could proceed without demonstrating "any legal or 
special individual interest in the result. "'3 But this section did not fully explain 
the urgency of allowing a group of trial lawyers and the state labor federation 
to pursue a facial attack on the entire statute rather than waiting for individual 
plaintiffs to raise specific issues in the ordinary course of litigation." It was 
left to a concurring opinion to explain that the very existence of the statutory 
tort reforms would deter the filing and pursuit of potentially meritorious 
76 Act of Sept. 26, 1996, 1996 Ohio Laws 3867. For a generally sympathetic but not 
uncritical assessment of this legislation, see Stephen J. Werber, Tort Reform Versus the Ohio 
Constillltion, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155 (1996). 
77 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
78 /d. at 1070. 
79 ld. at 107 I. 
80 There has been no shortage of criticism. E.g., Basil M. Loeb, Comment, Abuse of 
Power: Certain State Courts Are Disregarding Standing and Original Jurisdiction Principles 
So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitlllional, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 491 (2000); Jonathan 
Tracy, Note, Ohio ex rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The End Must Justify 
the Means, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 883 (2000); State Tort Refonn- Ohio Supreme Court Strikes 
Down State General Assembly's Tort Reform Initiative, 113 HARV. L. REV. 804 (2000). 
81 State es rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyer, 715 N.E.2d at 1103-ll. 
82 The structure of Justice Resnick's opinion might have resulted from pressure to 
release the decision rather than from a deliberate rhetorical strategy. The original complaint 
was filed in November 1997, and the decision was released in Augustl999./d. at 1062, 1068. 
The case's importance might have militated against further delay in polishing the opinion, at 
least in the majority's eyes. 
83 /d. at 1084-85. 
84 ld. at 1118-19 (Moyer, C.J.,joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting). 
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claims, and that it might take some time for the unconstitutional provisions to 
be authoritatively invalidated, if the issues were left to be resolved in ordinary 
litigation.'5 
Moreover, Justice Resnick's reliance on separation of powers in rejecting 
the legislature's effort to reenact provisions that the court had previously 
rejected was curious.•• As Chief Justice Moyer explained in his dissent, 
"enactment of a law that may be, or even is likely to be, later deemed void by 
this court does not constitute a violation of the doctrine of separation of 
powers."" He added that the judiciary remains free to invalidate the new 
measures as well."' Although the chief justice did not say so, this statement 
means that the court should have struck down the reenacted measures for 
violating the same constitutional provisions as the original measures did ... If 
the first statute of repose violated the right to remedy or due course of law, the 
new statute of repose likewise violated those constitutional guarantees. Using 
separation of powers to reach this result confuses rather than illuminates the 
legal analysis. 
Justice Resnick disposed of the rest of the 1996 tort statute by concluding 
that the bill contravened the Ohio Constitution's single-subject rule.90 
Moreover, it was impossible to sever any permissible provisions from the 
invalid portions.•• The dissenters disagreed, opining that the statute dealt with 
the general subject of tort reform (thereby satisfying the single-subject rule)92 
and that any invalid provisions were indeed severable."3 Why the majority took 
its approach to these issues can be understood more clearly by examining one 
last facet of the case. 
The opinion had a particularly striking tone. Justice Resnick began by 
characterizing the bill as "a challenge to the judiciary as a coordinate branch of 
government."" She curtly rejected the legislature's attempts to reenact 
measures that mirrored or differed only cosmetically from those that the court 
had previously invalidated-including statutes of repose for claims against 
architects and engineers, certificates of merit for medical malpractice claims, 
substantial abrogation of the collateral source rule, and caps on punitive and 
general damages."5 She described these legislative measures as attempts "to 
85 See id. at 1111-12 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
86 See id. at 1087-97. 
87 /d. at 1120 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting). 
88 See id. at 1121 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting). 
89 See id. 
90 /d. at 1101; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15(0). 
91 State ex rei. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1102. 
92 /d. at 1127 (Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., dissenting). 
93 /d. at 1128 (Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., dissenting). 
94 /d. at 1073. 
95 /d. at 1085-95. This portion of the opinion also invalidated legislative efforts to 
(continued) 
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usurp this court's constitutional authority" .. and denounced the bill for 
"brushing aside a mandate of this court on constitutional issues as if it were of 
no consequence," an action that "threatens the judiciary as an independent 
branch of government and tears at the fabric of our Constitution."•7 The 
General Assembly's reenactment of a previously rejected procedural 
requirement was "so fundamentally con.trary to the principle of separation of 
powers that it deserves no further comment."•s The new caps on punitive 
damages "create[d] the illusion of compliance" with the court's previous 
ruling;• but were in fact an "egregious" attempt to subvert the judiciary's 
· role .... , The legislature had apparently forgotten that "[t]his is a Constitution we 
are dealing with. " 10' 
This blunt language provided ammunition to those who regarded the 
opinion as a piece of unbridled judicial activism. Chief Justice Moyer 
expressed concern that, with this "inflammatory and accusatory language, the 
majority appears to be throwing down the gauntlet to that coequal legislative 
branch of government."'02 There is, however, another way of understanding 
Justice Resnick's opinion. Her controversial rhetoric was analogous to the 
United States Supreme Court's expansive conception of the judicial role in 
Cooper v. Aaron: 103 the Court's interpretation of the Constitution is final and 
binding on all other officials. 104 From this perspective, the Ohio General 
Assembly's attempt to overrule the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Ohio Constitution by passing a statute was reminiscent of the efforts by 
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus and other segregationists to nullify Brown v. 
Board of Education. 105 Like those latter-day proponents of interposition, the 
General Assembly's gambit did not deserve to be taken seriously, so the 
argument in favor of Justice Resnick's approach would go. 
Still, this is not the only view of the Ohio situation. Unlike the southern 
overrule judicial decisions about the standard for summary judgment in toxic tort cases and the 
admissibility of evidence of a common insurer in medical malpractice cases. !d. at I 095-96. 
96 ld. at 1086. 
97 /d. at 1087. 
98 /d. 
99 !d. at 109 I. 
100 !d. 
101 !d.; cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (18I9) ("we must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding"). 
102 State ex ret. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 7I5 N.E.2d at I I 14 (Moyer, C.J., 
joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting). 
103 358 U.S. I (1958). 
104 See id. at 17-I9. This view has attracted its share of criticism. See generally Daniel 
A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, I 982 U.IIL L. 
REV. 387 (1982). 
105 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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resisters, the legislature did not attack the state supreme court's rulings as 
illegitimate or seek to justify defiance of those decisions. '06 Rather, the General 
Assembly explained that it "respectfully disagree[ d)" with the Ohio Supreme 
Court and intended to "recognize" the positions taken by dissenting justices 
and in lower court rulings that the high court had reversed. 107 Although this 
language might simply have been a cunningly understated rhetorical salvo in 
an undeclared tort "war,"'08 it c<;mld alternatively have been seen as part of an 
interbranch conversation about the meaning of the Ohio Constitution. On this 
view, all three branches have an obligation to interpret the constitution; while 
the judiciary's interpretation is conclusive as to tl)e parties to a lawsuit, that 
interpretation does not necessarily bind everyone else, including the legislative 
and executive branches.'09 The legislature's 1996 tort statute might have been 
regarded as an invitation for the court to reconsider its recent decisions. 110 
Nevertheless, it is not entirely surprising that Justice Resnick and her 
majority colleagues took a less charitable and more adversarial view toward the 
General Assembly. The decisions targeted by the 1996 tort reform bill were, 
for the most part, decided by relatively wide margins: generally at least five 
justices supported the results in those cases.'" Although one new defense-
oriented justice (Deborah L.' Cook) had been elected in 1994, there was no 
reason to believe that this change would lead the court to rethink its recent 
torts jurisprudence. The legislature's sweeping reform measure went well 
beyond what the slightly realigned supreme court could be expected to approve 
and undoubtedly reflected the priorities of the state's newly energized 
Republican party, which in 1994 regained control of both houses of the 
General Assembly for the first time in more than two decades, swept all five 
executive offices, and ran an aggressive campaign against Justice Resnick in 
her successful bid for reelection.' 12 
106 This is in marked contrast to the Southern Manifesto, a joint statement condemning 
Brown by almost all members of Congress from the South. 102 CONG. REC. 4460-61,4515-16 
(1956). 
107 State ex rei. Ohio Acad. Of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1073-75 n.7, 1086. 
108 See id. at 1072 n.4 (quoting Werber, supra note 76; at 1156). 
109 E.g., ~Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers: 
Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 43-48 (1991); Barry Friedman, 
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-81, 655-58 (1993). 
110 There is some history of such invitations at the federal level. For example, the 
Truman administration filed a brief in 1950 that asked the Supreme Court to repudiate Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Brief for the United States at 35-49, Henderson v. United 
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25). More recently, the Reagan and first Bush 
administrations repeatedly asked the Court to overrule Rae v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13 (1973). 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
111 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
112 Justice Resnick was the only Democrat to win a statewide race that year, and hers 
(continued) 
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There will be more to say about this, but for now, some tentative 
conclusions can be reached. First, tort doctrine was emerging as a contentious 
subject in Ohio. The supreme court had become decidedly sympathetic to 
plaintiffs on issues over which there were .legitimate grounds for 
disagreement. 113 Second, many opinions in tort cases-whatever position they 
took-were not especially persuasive, although perhaps only law professors 
care very much about inelegant prose and inadequate reasoning. 11 ' Third, the 
majority believed that the issues raised by the legislature's omnibus tort bill 
were sufficiently significant to justify the use of expansive procedural devices 
to expedite judicial review of that measure. 115 Fourth, the tone of the legal 
debate had become increasingly harsh as the 2000 election approached. 116 
The law of torts, however, was not the only contentious issue in Ohio. The 
dominant focus of political debate was school funding, a subject that was put 
on the agenda by another controversial state supreme court ruling. 
B. School Funding 
In 1991, a coalition of school districts, educators, parents, and children 
filed a lawsuit alleging that Ohio's system of financing public schools violated 
the Ohio Constitution.''7 In DeRolph v. State, 11 ' by the same four to three vote 
that struck down the 1996 tort bill, 119 the supreme court held that primary 
reliance on local property taxes violated the Thorough and Efficient Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution.'2" The lead opinion, by Justice Francis E. Sweeney, 
relied heavily on trial testimony about the deplorable conditions in many 
was a nominally nonpartisan election. See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 115 (4th ed. 1998); RONALD A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 263 (4th ed. 1998). For further discussion of Justice Resnick's 1994 reelection, see 
infra notes 292-299 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. 
115 State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1079-85 
(Ohio 1999) (stating that an action for the extraordinary wits of mandamus and prohibition 
were appropriate to review the tort reform bill). 
116 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
117 Nine Years of Litigation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 12, 2000, at A6. 
118 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter referred to as DeRoiph 1]. 
119 State ex rei. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
120 Derolplz /, 677 N.E.2d at 747; 0H10CONST. art. VI,§ 2 ("The general assembly shall 
make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as ... will secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the State .... "). The court issued an order clarifying its 
first ruling in DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997), but that order contains little of 
substance for the present discussion. It reiterated the main point of DeRoiph /, that property 
taxes could continue to be used as long as they were not the primary means for financing public 
schools. /d. 
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school districts. in concluding that the state had breached its con~titutional 
obligations.'2' The court provided no specific remedial guidelines, saying only 
that the legislature "must create an entirely new school financing system" 
within one year.'22 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of an opinion built 
largely on anecdotal evidence, Justice Douglas wrote a comprehen~ive 
concurrence that examined the system of public school funding in considerable 
detail, 123 describing the inadeqyacy and inequity of the current funding system . 
with examples from several of the plaintiff school districts,'" and tracing the 
history and antecedents of Ohio's constitutional provisions relating to 
education. '25 ·Justice Douglas also directly addressed the impact of Board of 
Education v. Walter,l26 which rejected an earlier challenge to a subsequently 
repealed state school aid formula.'2' This was particularly significant because 
the dissenters based much of their argument on that case, contending the 
legislature was constitutionally required only to fund schools that met 
minimum standards; how much more the state should spend on elementary and 
secondary education was a nonjusticiable political question. 128 
DeRolph I generated widespread controversy, including some apparently 
serious proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over school funding cases. 129 
Cooler heads prevailed, and the General Assembly authorized substantial 
increases in state funding for public schools. The plaintiffs returned to court, 
and, in May 2000, Ju.stice Resnick wrote for another four to three majority to 
hold the legislature's response insufficient. 130 In marked contrast to the tort 
case, m her opinion was extremely deferential to the legislature. She noted the 
"substantial amount of legislation" that had been adopted in response to the 
court's first ruling, 132 described the adjustment of the state's basic aid formula 
121 Derolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 742-45. 
122 /d. at 747. 
123 /d. at 750-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
124 /d, at 757-68 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
125 /d. at 768-73 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
126 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979). 
127 DeRolph I, 677 N,E.2d at 773-74 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
128 /d. at 782, 783, 785, 786 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., . 
dissenting). On the merits, the dissenters found no violation of the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause even if the issues were justiciable./d. at 793 (Moyer, C.J.,joined by Cook & Lundberg · 
Stratton, 11:, dissenting). 
129 Jonathan L. Entin, Schools Need the Judicial Process, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 
12, 1999,atAI3. 
130 DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1020-22 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter referred to as 
DeRolph II]. 
131 See supra note 94-10 I and accompanying text. 
132 DeRolph II, 728 N.E:2d at 1003. 
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as "certainly a positive step,"'33 "acknowledge[d] the progress the General 
Assembly has made" in elevating public education as a budgetary priority, 13' 
observed that the legislature "has attempted to formulate a viable plan to fund 
the construction of new school facilities and to repair Ohio's decaying school 
buildings,"'35 and recognized that the state "has taken some steps to eliminate 
forced borrowing" by local school districts. 136 All of this was "evidence of 
some positive developments."'37 
Despite the conciliatory tone, the majority concluded that much remained 
to be done. '3' A glaring deficiency identified in DeRolph I was overreliance on 
property taxes, but "this aspect of the former system persists in the state's 
current funding plan, wholly unchanged."'39 Moreover, improvements were 
needed in almost every other area. 140 
The DeRolph II opinion had many fewer problems than did its counterpart 
in DeRolph /,and its rhetoric is much less acerbic than that in Ohio Academy 
of Trial Lawyers, the tort case. Nonetheless, certain aspects of DeRolph /I left 
Justice Resnick vulnerable to criticism in the election. One potential problem 
was her inability or unwillingness to define the limits of judicial oversight, as 
in her observations that "[t]he definition of 'thorough and efficient' is not 
static""' and that "much more is involved in this process than merely providing 
funds. "'•2 This raises the specter of an unending cycle of judicial supervision 
of the state's school funding and budgetary priorities, which is at least a fair 
criticism at election time.' 43 
133 !d. at 1005. 
134 !d. at 1008. 
135 !d. at 1009. 
136 !d. at 1012. 
137 !d. at 1020. 
us !d. at 1021-22. 
139 !d. at 1013. The only meaningful effort to move away from property taxes was a 
proposal to increase the state sales tax, but the voters rejected that idea by a wide margin in 
May 1998. !d. at 1015. 
140 !d. at 1021. The dissenters adhered to their view that the case presented 
nonjusticiable political questions but opined that, on the merits, the state's response to 
DeRolph I had been more than adequate. !d. at 1029 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg 
Stratton, JJ., dissenting). Justice Cook contended that the court should simply acknowledge its 
prior mistake and treat the case as nonjusticiable. !d. at 1036 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
141 !d. at 1001. 
142 !d. at 1019-20. One indication of the potential open-endedness of the lawsuit 
appeared in the midst of her lengthy conclusion, where she for the first time broached the need 
for classroom computers. See id. at I 020. 
143 See id. at 1029 (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissenting); 
see also DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733, 786-87 (Ohio 1997) (Moyer, C.J., joined by Cook & 
Lundberg Stratton, JJ ., dissenting). 
2002] JUDICIAL SELECTION AND POLITICAL CULTURE 539 
Justice Resnick's authorship of the lead opinions in two of the most 
publicized and contentious cases on the Ohio Supreme Court's docket in the 
runup to her reelection provided ample opportunity for legitimate criticism. 
This does not, however, explain why the campaign became so vitriolic.' .. 
Although most states elect their judges,"s few serious contests occur even for 
supreme court seats., •• The seeming excesses of judicial elections, such as the 
2000 Ohio campaign, have prompted some refonners to advocate the 
elimination, or at least reduction, of popular voting for the third branch of state 
govemment.''7 The notion that politics can be removed from judicial selection 
is a heroic one. The next section addresses this problem. 
II. POLillCS AND JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Any system of judicial selection must address the cardinal values of 
independence and accountability. 148 Judges must be independent enough to 
decide cases according to law rather than popular whim, but accountabie 
enough not to run roughshod over the people's Iiberties. 14• The states have 
emphasized accountability, with most judges having to face the electorate at 
some point. 'so Chief Justice Moyer's proposal to appoint rather than elect state 
judges in the wake of last year's ugly Ohio Supreme Court campaign implies 
that accountability has been taken to excess. 's' 
Aside- from the unlikely prospect that Ohio will stop electing judges 
anytime soon, 152 Chief Justice Moyer's proposal implies that the influence of 
politics can be removed (or at least reduced) by opting for a different mode of 
choosing judges. 153 In fact, the federal model of appointing judges can serve as 
a useful check on this idea. It turns out that elective and appointive systems do 
not differ all that much in their actual operation. For example, most incumbent 
144 See generally supra noteS 1-3 and accompanying text. 
145 BAUM, supra note 112, at 114-15; CARP& STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 262-64. 
146 BAUM, supra note 112, at 116, 120; Richard L. Hasen, "High Coun Wrongly 
Elected": A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1997). 
147 <CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 265. 
148 See Roger Handberg, Selection and Retention ofJudges: Is Florida's Present System 
Still the Best Compromise?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 134 (1994) (suggesting accountability is 
"as critical as" independence). 
149 See BAUM, supra note 112, at 101. 
150 /d. at 114-15. 
151 See Bradshaw, supra note 3. 
152 Julie Carr Smyth, Legislators Uninterested in Appointed Judges: Chief Justice 
Seeking Allies to Push'ldea, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 18, 2001, at 82. The idea of appointing 
judges in Ohio is not new. See Francis R. Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement, and 
Compensation of Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408,420-21 (1931). 
153 See Bradshaw, supra note 3. 
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judges are rarely opposed for reelection, and the overwhelming majority of 
judges who face the voters retain their seats.'5' Meanwhile, federal judges 
sometimes find themselves at the center of political controversy. Consider in 
this regard the story of Judge Harold Baer of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York. After granting a motion to suppress 
evidence in a drug case, he was threatened with impeachment by congressional 
leaders and virtually invited to resign by the White House, where the press 
secretary declared President Clinton would await Judge Baer's ruling on the 
government's motion to reconsider his original ruling before taking a formal 
stand on Judge Baer' s continuance in office. 155 
This section focuses on the federal bench, both the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts. The politics of federal judicial appointments can be seen most 
clearly in connection with the selection of Supreme Court justices.'56 This is 
hardly surprising in light of the Court's position at the apex of the national 
judiciary. For at least two decades, however, appointments to federal district 
courts and courts of appeals have also reflected political concernsY' The main 
conclusion to be drawn from this brief discussion is that political 
considerations are ubiquitous in judicial selection, even when the judges need 
not face the voters. 
A. The Supreme Court 
Political considerations have long influenced the selection of Supreme 
Court justices.m Presidents generally nominate justices who share their 
political ideology, but they must take account of the views of various interest 
groups as well as the Senate's role in confirming nominees. •s• For much of the 
twentieth century, discussion about prospective justices focused on supposedly 
154 See BAUM, supra note 112, at 120; B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial 
Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1429-30 (2001 ). 
155 Carl E. Stewart, Colltemporary Challenges to Judicial independence, 43 LOY. L. 
REV. 293, 298-300 (1997). Judge Baer seems to have gotten the message; on reconsideration 
he decided that the drug evidence was admissible after all. United States v. Bayless, 9I3 F. 
Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y 1996), vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 2I I (S.D.N.Y. I996), 
aff'd, United States v. Bayless, 20 I F.3d I I 6 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse of discretion by 
Judge Baer in reconsidering his initial ruling on suppression and rejecting the defendant's 
argument that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek Judge Baer's recusal), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. !06I (2000). 
156 See Part II.A. infra. 
157 See Part II.B. infra. 
158 See generally William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial 
Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. I, 3-25 ( 1990). 
159 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 17-52 ( 1999). 
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neutral factors relating to judicial competence.'60 To be sure, there were 
controversies about some nominees, but the debate turned largely on symbolic 
questions of ethics and character because explicit consideration of ideology 
was regarded as inappropriate.'"' The lengthy dispute about Justice Brandeis's 
nomination in 1916 illustrates this phenomenon.'"2 Until 1970, the only 
twentieth-century nominee who faced significant ideological opposition in the 
Senate was Judge John Parker, whose nomination was rejected in 1930.'"3 
Parker was attacked by the NAACP for racist campaign speeches he made as 
the unsuccessful Republican candidate for governor of North Carolina in 1918 
and for by unions his rulings in labor cases.'"' 
The public gentility that shrouded the politics of Supreme Court 
appointments began to erode in 1968 when Chief Justice Earl Warren 
announced his retirement effective on the confirmation of his successor.'"5 The 
announcement came well into a presidential election year in which Republican 
candidate Richard Nixon seemed likely to win (as he in fact did). 166 Warren's 
timing fueled concern that he wanted to deprive Nixon, who had criticized 
many Warren Court decisions and who had been his political rival in 
California, of the chance to fill the vacancy with his own selection.'"7 Outgoing 
President Lyndon Johnson nominated his old friend Justice Abe Fortas to fill 
the vacancy, but Fortas withdrew in the face of a Senate filibuster.'"' He 
remained on the Court for another year, then was forced to resign under an 
ethical cloud.'•• 
The public role of ideology began to increase in salience with President 
Nixon's failed nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth to succeed Fortas in 
160 /d. at 1-2. 
161 /d. at 3. 
162 See generally A.L. TODD, JUSTICEONTRIAL:THECASEOFLoutsD. BRANDEIS (1964). 
163 See generally KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE DEFEAT OF 
JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER ( 1990); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A 
STUDY OFTHECONFIRMATIONOFAPPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITEDSTATESSENATE 127-32 (1953). 
164 Ross, supra note 158, at 10-13. 
165 ld. at 15-1.6. 
166 See ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 218. 
167 BERNARD SCHWARIZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT- A 
JUDICiAL BIOGRAPHY 680-82 ( 1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 306-,. 
07' 309 (1982). 
168 See ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 218-19. Most of the explicit arguments against 
Fortas dealt with cronyism because Fortas had a long and close relationship with Johnson 
before his appointment as an associate justice in 1965. ld at 216. Nonetheless, general 
hostility to the Court's liberal rulings, as opposed to any particular Fortas opinion, played some 
. role in the opposition. /d. at 31-32. 
169 LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORT AS: ABIOGRAPHY359-78 (1990); BRUCEALI.ENMURPHY, 
FORT AS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 545-77 ( 1988). 
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1970. 170 Although Haynsworth was attacked for alleged ethicallapses, 17 ' his 
opponents emphasized his rulings in favor of management in labor cases and 
his conservative approach to civil rights issues. 112 But ideological concerns 
receded after the Senate rejected Haynsworth. 173 President Nixon's next 
choice, Judge Harrold Carswell, was regarded as extremely conservative, but 
the opposition concentrated on his obvious lack of competence. 17' Ideology _ 
played almost no role in the confirmation of Nixon's third choice, Justice 
Harry B lackmun, although B lackmun' s civil rights record had weaknesses that 
were never pursued. 175 
Ideology emerged with a vengeance during the pitched battle over 
President Reagan's unsuccessful nomination of Judge Robert Bark in 1987. 176 
Bark's confirmation hearing featured a five-day grilling on an extraordinary 
array of issues, and, in the end, he was rejected largely because his views on 
important constitutional questions were regarded as extreme. 177 Ideology also 
played a prominent role in the debate over the nomination of Justice Clarence 
Thomas, although that subject was overshadowed by the controversy over 
170 Ross, supra note 158, at 16. 
171 JOHN P. FRANK,CLEMENTHAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, ANDTHESUPREMECOURT21-
22, 45, 51-56 (1991). 
172 Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of Political Debate, II 
YALE L & PoL'Y REV. 407,412-14 (1993). His most controversial civil rights ruling came in 
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors. !d. at 412. Haynsworth held that the federal courts should 
abstain from hearing a lawsuit challenging the closure of the public schools in Prince Edward 
County, one of the original defendants in Brown v. Board of Education, while a parallel case 
was proceeding slowly in the Virginia courts. Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332. 
343-44 (4th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court reversed that ruling and ordered the schools 
reopened. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
173 Ross, supra note 158, at 19-20. 
174 ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 11-12; Entin, supra note 172, at414-15. Carswell's 
fate was effectively sealed when his leading Senate supporter, defending him against charges of 
mediocrity, said: "Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and 
lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't 
have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there." FRANK, supra 
note 171, at 112. 
175 Entin, supra note 172, at 417-18. Ideological opposition was almost completely 
absent when Nixon chose another southerner, Lewis Powell, for a subsequent vacancy, even 
though Powell also had an awkward civil rights record. !d. at 418-19. 
176 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA ( 1989). 
177 Some senators voted against Bork less out of conviction than on straightforward 
political calculation: a desire to satisfy important constituency groups. /d. at 285-86, 289-92. 
Bork' s opponents, like some of Justice Resnick's, used a sophisticated but not always accurate 
publicity campaign in an effort to scuttle his confirmation. /d. at 157-60, 177-80. 
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Anita Hill's sexual harassment allegations against him."" 
On the other hand, ideological debate was subdued in other recent 
confirmation proceedings. For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was 
selected in large part to fulfill President Reagan's campaign pledge to appoint 
the first woman to the Court; most of the limited criticism she encountered 
came from those who complained that she was too sympathetic to abortion 
rights.'79 Justice Antonin Scalia was touted as the Court's first Italian 
American member and won unanimous confirmation.'•" Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's conservative record on the Ninth Circuit generated almost no 
opposition; he was confirmed with the backing of some of Judge Bark's 
harshest critics.'"' Many skeptics suspected that Justice David Souter was a 
closet extremist based on his sponsorship by the very conservative White 
House chief of staff, but they had little other basis for condemning him 
because he was almost completely unknown before his nomination.' 82 Most 
recently, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer faced questions 
that related to ideology but evaded them without much negative reaction from 
senators, and both were easily confirmed.'•' 
At the same time, ideological considerations did affect these nominations. 
President Reagan and the first President Bush certainly sought relatively 
conservative nominees who could be confirmed by the Senate when they 
selected O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter.' .. President Clinton twice 
seriously considered Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, but ultimately 
chose Ginsburg and Breyer due in part to the prospect of opposition from 
powerful Republican Senators.'"' Moreover, Clinton was almost dissuaded 
from choosing Ginsburg, who had litigated most of the major gender 
discrimination cases that reached the Court during the 1970's, because some 
178 See generally JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNilZ, CAPITOL GAMES: 
CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION (1992). 
179 ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 284. 
ISO /d. at 293-94. Scalia's prospects were helped by his being nominated at the same 
time that then-Justice Rehnquist was selected to succeed Chief Justice Burger. Rehnquist's 
nomination was controversial, which might have deflected opposition to Scalia. /d. at 292, 
294. 
181 BRONNER, supra note 176, at337-38. 
182 ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 305-06. 
183 Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 925-29 
(1995). 
184 ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at -284, 294,299,305. Although Souter has not turned 
out to be as conservative as expected, ex-President Bush professes no disappointment at this 
development. /d. at 308. 
185 /d. at 317,322. 
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feminists viewed her as insufficiently committed to their cause. 186 
This brief summary should suffice to show that political considerations 
play a substantial role in Supreme Court appointments. Ideology matters to the 
Presidents who appoint justices and often affects the confirmation process."' 
Opposition is more likely with a chief executive from one party and a Senate 
controlled by the other, as was true of the Haynsworth, Carswell, Bork, and 
Thomas nominations. But divided government does not necessarily lead to 
confrontation, as the examples of Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer 
demonstrate. Conflict is also more probable when the seat at issue can affect 
the Court's direction, as demonstrated by the filibuster against Fortas during 
the 1968 presidential election campaign'88 and the Bork controversy, which 
arose in large measure because he seemed likely to provide the deciding vote 
on several high-stakes issues and had announced his willingness to repudiate 
precedents of which he disapproved. 189 This last observation has significant 
implications for understanding the vigorous campaign against Justice Resnick: 
on a court divided four to three on issues that matter intensely to various 
interest groups, defeating one member of the majority can change the direction 
of legal doctrine. This point will be addressed again later, but first it is worth 
devoting some attention to the politics of appointments to the federal appellate 
and district courts. 
B. The Lower Federal Courts 
A somewhat different sort of politics typifies the process for appointing 
federal circuit and district judges. Although the Constitution gives the 
President the power to nominate these judges subject to the advice and consent 
of the Senate,'90 senators have long played a major role in judicial selection. 
This has been especially true of district judgeships, where the tradition of 
senatorial courtesy allowed a home-state senator of the chief executive's party 
to recommend judicial candidates and to block other nominees. '9 ' Senatorial 
courtesy does not apply at the appellate level, although it is understood that 
each state in a circuit is entitled to its share of seats and senators from the party 
that controls the White House typically recommend candidates. 192 
Appointments to the lower courts have become a more visible matter in 
186 /d. at 318-19. 
187 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
190 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
191 ABRAHAM, supra note 159, at 20-21; BAUM, supra note 112, at 107; CARP & 
STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 224-26. When a state had senators of different parties, they 
occasionally negotiated an arrangement under which the senator of the opposite party could 
recommend a few district judges. BAUM, supra note 112, at 108-09. 
192 CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 232. 
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recent decades, however, as various administrations have regarded those courts 
as important political vehicles. President Reagan and the first President Bush 
tried to appoint conservatives to circuit and district judgeships,,., whereas 
President Johnson sought to select judges, especially in the South, who were 
sympathetic to civil rights.••• President Clinton focused less strictly on 
ideology than on increasing the diversity of the federal bench.,., 
The process became notably contentious during the Clinton years, 
especially after Republicans captured control of the Senate in the 1994 
election. The pace of confirmations slowed to a crawl, with only seventeen 
judges (none at the appellate level) approved during the second session of the 
1 04th Congress in 1996.••• Although the administration was partly at fault for 
taking longer than its predecessors to nominate judges, the Senate also 
extended the time it took to act on those nominations. 197 An especially 
egregious example is Judge Richard Paez, who waited four years to be 
confirmed for a seat on the Ninth Circuit. ••• Partisan sniping over judicial 
appointments has continued since Clinton left office.I99 
Several factors help to explain the increasing difficulty of filling lower 
court judgeships. An important one is divided government: a Senate 
controlled by one party has little interest in allowing a President of the other to 
pack the federal bench and will exercise its constitutional prerogatives more 
assiduously than it would if the same party controlled both branches.200 Beyond 
193 BAUM, supra note 112, at 1 II. 
194 Id. This contrasted with President Kennedy's acquiescence to pressure from powerful 
Senators who insisted on the appointment of segregationists. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 
112, at 230. 
195 I d.; CARP& STIDHAM, supra note 112, at 230, 233; Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at 
the Clinton Administration's End, 19 LAw & INEQ. 159, 159 (2001). The overwhelming 
majority of Clinton's judicial appointments were Democrats, though. See ABRAHAM, supra 
note 159, at 50. 
196 BAUM, supra note 1 12, at 112; Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing 
Congressional Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 KY. L.J. 679, 761 (1999). 
197 Lauren M. Cohen, Missing in Action: Interest Groups and Federal Judicial 
Appointments, 82 JUDICATURE 119, 121 (1998); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's 
Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 271-73 (1999); 
Thomas 0. Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens for 
Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (1999). 
198 Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointmellls 
Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1709 n.79 (2001). 
199 See Amy Goldstein, Bush Blasts Democrats for Lagging on Judicial Nominees, 
WASH. POST, May 4, 2002, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senat Trade 
Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9. 
200 BAUM, supra note 112, at 112; Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New 
Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Conselll," 53 
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that factor, however, are several others that have emerged in recent years: the 
heightened salience of intractable issues like abortion and affirmative action 
that do not lend themselves to compromise, the activities ofinterest groups that 
closely monitor judicial appointments, and the permanent campaign that leads 
both parties to begin mobilizing toward the next election within hours of the 
final vote tabulation. 201 All of these factors have contributed to institutional 
changes in the Senate that have complicated the judicial confirmation process. 
Among these are a decline in deference to colleagues, the more frequent use 
or threatened use of procedural devices that give individual Senators an 
effective veto power over committee and floor agendas, and the power of 
committee chairs to refuse to act on nominations.202 
The federal experience has implications for the Buckeye State. As 
deplorable as the excesses of 2000 might be, those excesses cannot be 
attributed exclusively to the process for choosing members of the Ohio 
Supreme Court. The election was certainly political, 203 but contemporary 
federal experience suggests that politics cannot be transcended by using a 
purely appointive system.204 Moreover, recent developments in the rules 
relating to judicial campaigning raise serious questions about the prospects for 
compelling those who care about judicial selection to adhere to higher 
standards of discourse.205 The next section focuses on some of those 
developments. 
III. THE DUBIOUS PROSPECT ofLIMITrNG CAMPAIGN ATTACKS 
Harsh campaign rhetoric in judicial elections may be ameliorated by 
enforcing existing rules that limit what judges and judicial candidates may say. 
Speech restrictions in judicial elections have been controversial/06 but this 
approach has been tried in Ohio. The leading case, In re Harper/"7 arose from 
Justice Resnick's successfull994 reelection campaign. Resnick's opponent in 
that race, Judge Sara J. Harper, was reprimanded for running a television 
advertisement that attacked Resnick for accepting more than $300,000 in 
ADMIN. L. REv. I, 12 (2001 ); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 197, at 271. 
201 BAUM, supra note 112, at 112; Denning, supra note 200, at 12-14. 
202 BAUM, supra note 112, at 112; Denning, supra note 200, at 14--21. 
203 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
204 See Parts I I.A. and B. supra. 
205 See Part III infra. 
206 See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial 
Ethics, 9 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059 (1996)(supporting restrictions); Lloyd B. Snyder, The 
Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for 
Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1987) (opposing most restrictions). 
201 673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996). The tribunal that decided this case was a special panel 
made up of twelve appellate judges sitting by designation on the Ohio Supreme Court. I d. at 
1255 n.l. 
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contributions from triallawyers.208 The ad showed a large check drawn on an 
account called "Sue & Sue, Trial Lawyers" and signed "Cheatem Good."109 
Harper was found to have undermined public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary and to have failed to maintain the dignity 
appropriate to the judicial office in violation of two provisions of the Ohio 
Code of Judicial Conduct.210 Voters, the court concluded, might reasonably 
have inferred from the ad that plaintiffs' lawyers as a class are dishonest and 
that these dubious characters wanted Resnick to win.211 Whatever else might 
be said about the controversial spot,212 it appears rather tame compared to the 
thinly veiled charges of corruption and vote selling that aired repeatedly in 
2000.213 
The provisions under which Judge Harper was charged were superseded 
when Ohio adopted new standards in 1995.214 Canon 7 of Ohio's new Code of 
Judicial Conduct, which directs judges and candidates to "refrain from 
political activity inappropriate to judicial office," contains two specific 
provisions that bear on this subject. One limits what candidates may say about 
themselves.215 Canon 7(B) proscribes "statements that commit or appear to 
commit the judge or judicial candidate with respect to cases or controversies 
that are likely to come before the court."216 The other restricts what they can 
say about others.217 Canon 7(E) prohibits an incumbent or aspiring judge from 
disseminating "information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent, 
either knowing the information to be false or with reckless disregard of 
whether or not it was false or, if true, that would be deceiving or misleading to 
a reasonable person. "118 
It is not at all certain that rigorous enforcement of these provisions can 
elevate the tone of judicial election campaigns. Restrictions on what judges 
and judicial candidates may say could well violate the First Amendment. That 
208 /d. at 1256. 
209 /d. 
210 /d. at 1267-68. 
211 /d.at1267. 
212 Judge Harper, who had never before been disciplined in a long career on the bench, 
initially had reservations but eventually approved the ad for use in her campaign. /d. at 1256. 
213 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
214 Both sets of rules were based on American Bar Association proposals. See MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). The 1972 
rules were adopted in forty-seven states, the 1990 version in twenty-two. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN 
ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02, at 3-5 & nn.19~23 (3d ed. 2000). 
215 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canon 7(B)(2)(d). 
216 /d. 
211 !d. Canon 7(E)(l). 
218 /d. 
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argument was raised unsuccessfully in Harper,Z 19 but it has fared better in some 
other courts.22" Because these restrictions apply to political speech, they are 
evaluated under strict scrutiny.221 Accordingly, regulations must serve a 
compelling interest and be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 222 Courts 
have consistently held that the states have a compelling interest in protecting 
the integrity ofthe judiciary.223 The dispositive question has been whether the 
restrictions satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. 220 
Consider Canon ?(B)'s prohibition on statements that reflect an advance 
commitment on matters that are likely to come before the court.m The case law 
on this topic has arisen under a version of the Code of Judicial Conduct that 
forbade a judge or judicial candidate from "announc[ing] his or her views on 
disputed legal or political issues."226 Courts have genemlly agreed that this 
sweeping language, litemlly understaod, would prohibit almost any statement 
other than bland promises to perform faithfully and impartially on the bench.227 
So construed,. therefore, this limitation mises serious questions · of 
overbreadth. 228 The restriction might be saved from invalidity through a 
narrowing construction that it applies only to speech on matters that are likely 
to come before the court. 229 The fedeml courts of appeals have disagreed on 
whether such a narrowing construction could salvage the rule.230 The Third 
Circuit held that the restriction should be so limited and upheld on this basis in 
219 Judge Harper argued that the two provisions of the prior version of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad both on their face and as 
applied. Harper, 673 N.E.2d at 1260--67. 
220 The Ohio Supreme Court avoided the merits of a constitutional challenge to the prior 
version of Canon 7(E)(I ), on procedural grounds. Christensen v. 8<1. ofComm'rs, 575 N.E.2d 
790 (Ohio 1991) (per curiam). First Amendment arguments seem not to have been raised in 
other recent disciplinary proceedings arising from judicial campaigns. E.g., Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 733 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 2000); In re Kienzle, 708 N.E.2d 800 
(Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999); In re Runyan, 707 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 
1999) (dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 
Comm'n of Judges 1999); In re Carr, 658 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1995). 
221 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1991). 
222 /d. 
223 /d. at 142. 
224 See, e.g., id. at 142-44. 
225 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B). 
226 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(I)(c) (1972). 
227 See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993). 
228 /d. 
229 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1991). 
230 Robert M. Brode, Note, Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board and Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Board of the Supreine Court: First Amendment Limits on Ethical Restrictions of 
Judicial Candidate's Speech, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 1085, 1086 (1994). 
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. Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. m The 
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner, held to the 
contrary in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board.232 A sharply divided 
panel ofthe Eighth Circuit recently sided with the Third Circuit and upheld the 
restriction as narrowly construed. 233 
In June 2002, a closely divided Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit 
and held that the Announce Clause of the old Canon 7(B) violates the First 
Amendment. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White234, a five to four 
majority concluded that the proscription against a judicial candidate's 
announcing her views on disputed legal or political issues was not narrowly 
tailored to promote the state's interests in judicial impartiality or the 
appearance ofimpartiality.235 The Court considered three possible meanings of 
judicial impartiality and found that the restriction failed under all of them. To 
the extent that impartiality means the absence of bias for or against a litigant, 
which the majority apparently assumed to be a compelling interest, the 
Announce Clause was irrelevant because it did not apply to speech favoring or 
opposing specific litigants but rather to speech about legal questions. 236 
Protecting impartiality in the sense of avoiding declarations about views 
favoring or opposing a specific legal point, the majority opined, was simply 
not a compelling interest and hence could not pass muster as a justification for 
the restriction.237 Finally the ban could not be justified as a means of protecting 
judicial open mindedness both because the state had not relied on this 
justification in adopting Canon 7(B) and because this restriction was fatally 
underinclusive in that it did not limit other forms of speech about disputed 
legal issues·23' 
Of course, Ohio's new Canon 7(B) explicitly limits its prohibition to 
comments on issues that are likely to come before the court.239 This alone 
might save the provision from First Amendment attack. 2411 That is the lesson of 
Kentucky's experience. In J. C.J.D. v. R.J. C.R./41 the state supreme court held 
that the blanket ban on statements about disputed legal or political issues was 
231 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991). 
232 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993). 
233 Republican PartyofMinn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854,881-83 (8th Cir. 2001); but see id. 
at 894 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
234 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002). 
235 /d. at 2534-37. 
236 See id. at 2535. 
237 /d. at 2536. 
238 See id. at 2536-37. 
239 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B){2)( d). 
240 See Stretton, 944 F.3d at 144. 
241 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991). 
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unconstitutionally overbroad and refused to adopt a narrowing construction.242 
The state then adopted a new provision that is identical with Ohio's new 
Canon 7(B), which the court upheld against First Amendment challenge in 
Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission.243 Before concluding 
that this decision resolves the constitutional question, it should be noted that 
there ·was a strong dissenting opinion arguing that even this narrower 
restriction violated the First Amendment.241 The problem with limiting the 
prohibition to statements· about matters "that are likely to come before the 
court," as Judge Posner explained in Buckley, is that almost any controversial 
matter could come before a court, so that limitation might not meaningfully 
confine the scope of the restriction. 245 This question need not be resolved here. 
This question need not be resolved here, although some language in the 
majority opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota suggests that the Supreme 
Court might reject even the new Canon ?(B)'s narrow limitation on judicial 
speech.246 ' For now, it suffices to say that the constitutionality of the new 
Canon 7(B) remains unsettled. 
It is now appropriate to consider Canon 7(E)'s prohibition on false, 
deceiving, or misleading campaign statements.247 The case law from other 
jurisdictions has generally dealt with an earlier proscription against any 
statement that "the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, 
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law. "24s Several recent decisions have found this 
proscription unconstitutionaJ.249 The leading case on false statements is In re 
242 ld. at 956. 
243 873 S.W.2d 200,204-05 (Ky. 1994); see also Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Retirement 
& Removal Comrn'n, 776 F. Supp. 309,315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (denying preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of the ban on statements about issues "that are likely to come before the 
court" but granting an injunction against enforcement of a ban on campaign speech about 
matters of judicial administration); Sumrne v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 947 
S. W.2d 42, 47-48 (Ky. 1997) (relying on Deters to reject a First Amendment challenge to the 
new restriction on speech about matters "that are likely to come before the court"). 
244 Deters, 873 S. W.2d at 205-07 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); see also Summe v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d at 52, 54 
(Graves, J., dissenting). 
245 Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229. 
246 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (expressing 
skepticism that judges will feel compelled to rule consistently with campaign statem~nts 
that do not entail promises to vote in a particular way on a particular issue). 
247 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E). 
248 See, e.g., In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31,36 (Mich. 2000), cert. Denied sub nom. 
Chimura v. Mich. Judicial Tenure Comm'n, 531 U.S. 828 (2000). 
249 !d. at 45; Weaver v. Bonuer, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
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Chmura,250 in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that the proscription 
was not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in protecting 
judicial integrity and impartiality.251 The decision rested on overbreadth 
concerns: the restriction permitted punishment for false statements that were 
not made with actual malice. m To avoid this problem, the court narrowed it to 
cover only false statements made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth. 253 A federal district court in Georgia relied on Chmura 
to strike down a similar Peach State restriction on judicial campaign speech.m 
The court declined to adopt a narrowing construction that might have saved the 
prohibition despite recognizing the importance of the state interests at stake.m 
The provision of Ohio's Canon 7(E) prohibiting false statements explicitly 
requires such statements to be made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless 
disregard for the truth.256 Accordingly, this portion appears to satisfy First 
Amendment requirements. 
The situation might be different with regard to deceptive or misleading 
statements, however. Chmura found that the ban on such statements "greatly 
chills debate regarding the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. "2' 7 
This was one reason that the Michigan court found the old restriction facially 
unconstitutional.258 The Alabama Supreme Court just recently struck down 
language that is identical with Ohio Canon 7(E)'s ban on statements "that 
would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person."259 In Butler v. 
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission,,., the court held that this provision "is 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the plain effect of chilling First 
Amendment rights."26 ' Relying heavily on an opinion by a federal district 
judge at an earlier stage of the proceedings,262 the court explained that 
250 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Chmura v. Mich. Judicial 
Tenure Comm'n, 531 U.S. 828 (2000). 
251 !d. at 45. 
252 /d. at 41; cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280 (1964) (defining 
actual malice as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). 
253 Chmura, 608 N. W .2d at 4 3. The court emphasized that this standard was objective, 
unlike the subjective standard approved in New York Times v. "Sullivan. !d. at 43-44. 
254 Weaverv. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
255 /d. at 1343. 
256 OHio CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 7(E). 
257 Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 42. 
258 /d. at 43. 
259 OHio CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 7(E){I ). 
260 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 200 I). 
261 /d. at 218. 
262 The case arose when Justice Harold See ofthe Alabama Supreme Court filed suit in 
federal district court challenging the constitutionality of campaign speech restrictions that 
formed the basis of an investigation by the state's Judicial Inquiry Commission. I d. at 210-11. 
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candidates would be deterred from making even true statements for fear of 
incurring potentially severe sanctions and that this would in tum unduly limit 
political debate.2"3 The state court accordingly removed the language about 
deceptive or misleading statements, leaving only the prohibition on false 
statements made with actual malice.264 
These decisions strongly suggest that the provision in Ohio's Canon 7(E) 
prohibiting the dissemination of"true [statements] that would be deceiving or 
misleading to a reasonable person"265 also contravenes the First Amendment. 
This is particularly troublesome for proponents oflimits on obnoxious attacks 
ofthe sort that were directed at Justice Resnickbecause many ofthose attacks 
were not literally false. Instead, as in Harper, the business groups' ads got 
their bite from deception, exaggeration, or omission rather than from knowing 
or reckless falsity.266 
Even if the Code of Judicial Conduct's campaign speech restrictions 
survive First Amendment scrutiny, however, that would not address the 
problems that arose in the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court election. The offending 
advertisements last year were not run by candidates, but by interest groups that 
are not subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.261 The corruption charges 
appear to have been independent expenditures, and restrictions on that kind of 
spending present different First Amendment concerns. 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of restrictions on 
independent expenditures in judicial races, but it has expressed considerable 
skepticism about such limits in other election campaigns.2•• For example, in 
Buckley v. Va/eo,Z69 the Court invalidated a $1,000 ceiling on independent 
expenditures that explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate.270 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the ceiling was not narrowly 
After proceedings in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the state 
supreme court about the validity of the restrictions and the commission's procedures. Butler v. 
Ala. Judicial InquiryComm'n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (llthCir. 2000). Thecasearoseftoma 
tumultuous Republican primary for the party's nomination chief justice. William Glaberson, 
States Rein in Truth-Bending in Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,2000, at AI. Justice See's 
opponent, who won, was Judge Roy Moore. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
263 Butler, 802 So. 2d at 217-18 (quoting extensively from Butler v. Alabama Judicial 
Inquiry Comm'n, Ill F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234-36 (M.D. Ala. 2000)). 
264 !d. at 218. 
265 OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E). 
266 See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
268 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
269 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
270 !d. at 42-43. 
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tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.271 Because the restriction applied 
only to explicit advocacy concerning the election or defeat of a specific 
candidate, it could be evaded by the simple expedient of not using the magic 
words calling for the electorate to vote for or against a named individual. m 
Moreover, independent expenditures did not "pose dangers of real or apparent 
corruption" sufficient to justify regulation.213 Such spending, if truly 
uncoordinated with a favored candidate's campaign, might dilute or even 
contradict the candidate's campaign and was less likely to reflect the danger 
that the expenditure was part of a quid pro quo, a danger that justified limits on 
large contributions directly to candidates.m 
The Court reached a similar conclusion on the same reasoning in Federal 
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committe&75 
and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.276 Io 
NCP A C, the Court invalidated a criminal statute that forbade political action 
committees from making independent expenditures in excess of $1 ,000 in 
support of a presidential candidate who accepted public funding for the 
campaign. 277 The restriction on independent expenditures failed to survive 
strict scrutiny because there was no risk that such spending would promote 
corruption or the appearance of corruption. 278 Accordingly, the restriction was 
not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government .interest.279 In 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life the Court held unconstitutional as applied a. 
statutory prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for independent 
expenditures in federal elections while permitting such expenditures by a 
corporation from a separate fund made up of voluntary contributions~2'" The 
Court first reiterated that only "express advocacy" supporting or opposing a 
particular candidate fell under the definition of independent expenditures. 2' 1 At 
the same time; Massachusetts Citizens for Life although chartered as a 
211 ld. at 44. 
212 ld. at 45. 
273 Jd. at 46. 
274 See id. at 47. 
275 470 u.s. 480 (1985). 
276 479 u.s. 238 (1986). 
277 Nat'/ Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 482-83. 
278 Jd. at 496-97. 
279 ld. 
280 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241. 
281 I d. at 249. The Court added that the newsletter at issue was "express advocacy": it 
exhorted people to vote for prolife candidates and contained the names and photographs of 
candidates who fulfilled the organization's criteria in that regard. I d. This was, Justice Brennan 
wrote, "in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates." :That was sufficient, 
even though the newsletter did not actually tell readers to vote for any named candidate. ld. 
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corporation, was not the sort of large economic entity whose involvement in 
elections could pose a risk of corruption or distortion. 282 Accordingly, the ban 
on corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures could not validly 
apply to that organization.283 
Both of these cases contained language suggesting that prohibitions on 
independent expenditures by other corporations might be justifiable. 284 Those 
suggestions were vindicated in Austin v. Michigan Chamber ofCommerce,w 
which upheld a law prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds for 
independent expenditures supporting or opposing any candidate for state office 
while pennitting such expenditures from a segregated fund made up of 
voluntary contributions. 286 This law differed from the ban on spending 
corporate treasury funds in connection with referenda that had been struck 
down in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 287 The prohibition against 
corporate spending in candidate elections was designed to promote the state's 
compelling interest in alleviating "the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate fonn and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for 
the corporation's political ideas. ''288 Moreover, the law was "precisely targeted" 
to advance this interest by eliminating the corrosive effects of direct corporate 
spending while simultaneously pennitting corporations to operate segregated 
political funds that could make independent expenditures on behalf of or 
against particular candidates.289 
Austin might rest in uneasy tension with Bellotti, but it remains good law. 
Taken together, these independent expenditure cases suggest that it could be 
exceedingly difficult for states to control spending in judicial elections. Of 
course, corporations might have to set up separate political action committees, 
but Buckley, NCPA C, and Massachusetts Citizens for Life erect a high barrier 
against intrusive restrictions on independent expenditures. Further, limiting 
the definition of "independent expenditures" to express advocacy supporting 
or opposing a named candidate provides yet another severe obstacle to reining 
io vitriolic attacks. None of the controversial anti-R~snick ads, for example, 
directly advocated a vote against her or in favor ofher opponent. Accordingly, 
whatever the scope ofpennissible restrictions on independent expenditures in 
282 See id. at 263-64. 
283 ld. 
284 See id.; Nat'/ Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 490-501. 
285 494 u.s. 652 (1990). 
286 ld at 654-55. 
287 435 U.S. 765 (1978); See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60 (distinguishing the Michigan 
regulation because "it ensure[ d] that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political 
ideas espoused by corporations"). 
288 ld at 660. 
289 [d. 
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judicial races, those restrictions might not apply to many obnoxious 
statements. 290 
There is one last obstacle to consider. Even if independent expenditures 
could be limite'd, judicial candidates themselves have been raising more and 
more money for their campaigns.291 This trend will likely continue in the wake 
of federal court rulings overturning spending limits in judicial races. In Suster 
v. Marshal/,292 several candidates for common pleas judgeships successfully 
challenged the $75,000 limit that the Ohio Supreme Court had promulgated.293 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of that limit because it was not narrowly 
tailored to advance the state's at least arguably compelling interests in 
preventing judges from being distracted from their duties by the need to 
concentrate on fund-raising and in promoting public trust in the judiciary.294 
The Ohio Supreme Court responded by varying the cap based on the 
population of the jurisdiction served by each judgeship, with a maximum of 
$125,000 for common pleas judgeships in the largest counties. m The district 
court concluded that the new limits still ran afoul of the First Amendment 
because they were not narrowly tailored to promote any compelling 
governmental interest.296 The increase in the ceiling for larger jurisdictions did 
not address the fundamental problem that spending caps were not an effective 
means of promoting judicial integrity.297 
In short, restricting what judicial candidates say about themselves or about 
their opponents might run afoul of the First Amendment. Even if direct 
290 As a matter of fact, this problem has prevented action to compel disclosure, of the 
donors who supplied the money used for the anti-Resnick ads. The Ohio Elections 
Commission, after changing its mind twice, decided that it lacked jurisdiction over the spots 
because they did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. T.C. Brown, 
Officials Won't Review Ads Against Judge, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5, 2001, at B4; Joe Hallett, 
Free Speech Protects Attack Ads, Ruling Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 2001, at A1. 
Both state and federal courts have also declined to order disclosure. U.S. Judge Rejects Suit 
Over Resnick Attack Ads, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 30, 2002, at B4. 
291 Sarah McKenzie, Page Warns of Dangers ofCainpaign Money in State Judicial 
Elections, STAR TRIB., Nov 16,2001, at Al3. 
292 951 F.Supp.693(N.D.Ohio 1996),affd, 149F.3d523(6thCir.l998). 
293 /d. at 696. The Ohio Supreme Court had imposed spending caps on races for other 
judicial offices. 149 F.3d at 525 n.l. 
294 951 F. Supp. at 699-701. The court refused to enjoin a separate provision forbidding 
judicial candidates from using funds raised while campaigning for a nonjudicial office, in large 
measure because such funds might well have been raised in circumstances that violate other 
legitimate restrictions on judicial candidates' speech. See id. at 703. 
295 Susterv. Marshall, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
296 ld. at 1151. 
297 /d. 
556 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [30:523 
restrictions on candidate speech pass constitutional muster, the debasing 
effects of independent expenditures may still go unaddressed. 
N. BEYOND TINKERING WITH THE RULES 
Before giving up in despair, we should consider the lessons of the last 
Ohio Supreme Court election must be considered. Millions of dollars were 
spent last year, many of them for scurrilous attacks, but Justice Resnick won 
by a large margin.29' In fact, the attacks apparently helped her mobilize 
support. 299 Many observers believe that the aggressive anti-Resnick campaign 
by business groups actually enabled her to win an election that she otherwise 
would have losP .. Republicans have dominated Ohio politics lately, and there 
was a respectable-:-albeit not airtight-case to be made ~gainst her record. 301 
Nor was Ohio the only state where aggressive business advertising failed: the 
chief justice of· the Mississippi Supreme Court was defeated despite the 
support of corporate and industry groups, although political strategists for 
business interests profess themselves satisfied with the overall results.302 
This was not the first time that rhetorical overkill by interest groups 
backfired: The National Conservative Political Action Committee, at one time 
the scourge of liberals, lost much of its luster with a series of shrill attacks on 
the apparently vulnerable Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland in 1982.303 
Things got so bad that his Republican opponent, the purported beneficiary of 
those efforts, urged NCP AC to stop because Sarbanes (like Resnick) was using 
the attacks to mobilize support for what turned out to be an easy victory. 3,.. No 
298 Bradshwa, supra note II; T.C. Brown, Resnick Overcomes Attacks, Wins High Court 
Race, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 8, 2000, at AI. 
299 E.g., James Bradshaw, Group Begins Campaign ofPro-ResnickAds, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Nov. I, 2000, at C2; Paul Souhrada, Labor Leaders Rally Troops/or Resnick, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. I, 2000, at C3. 
300 E.g., Brent Larkin, Campaign "Geniuses" Hinder Both Parties, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 
12, 2000, at Gl; A Campaign That Backfired, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2000, at 812; _A 
Landslide, Thanks to the Chamber of Commerce, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 9, 2000, at B I 3. 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87, 94-110, and 141-143. 
302 Emily Heller, Mixed Results for C ofC, NAT'LL.J., Nov. 20,2000, at AI; see also 
Louis Jacobson, Lobbying/or "Justice" in State Courts, 32 NAT'LJ. 3678 (2000). 
303 See Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation of Independent Expenditures by 
PACs, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 13, 27 (1984). 
304 Alison Muscatine, Hogan Again Denounces NCPAC Ads in Debate with Sarbanes, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1982, at B3. 
Crude intervention by outsiders sometimes works, however. Consider the three-way 1970 
Senate race in New York. Hoping to defeat Democratic candidate Richard Ottinger, the Nixon 
White House dispatched Vice President Spiro Agnew to attack Senator Charles Goodell, a 
moderate Republican who had alienated the administration and trailed badly in the polls. The 
third candidate was James Buckley, the nominee of the Conservative Party and more in 
(continued) 
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one claims that the level of political discourse has improved since then, so it 
should not be expected that the failure of the anti-Resnick campaign will 
ennoble judicial elections by discouraging similar efforts. lOS 
At the same time, Justice Resnick's victory shows how difficult it is to 
unseat an incumbent jurist. The examples of Rose Bird and her California 
colleagues, David Lanphier, and Penny White resonate in part because they are 
so unusual. Indeed, those examples have alerted other potentially vulnerable 
judges of the dangers of complacency. Byway of illustration, Justice White's 
1996 defeat led Justice Adolpho Birch, the author of the opinion that was used 
to devastating effect against White, to began planning his 1998 reelection 
campaign early; he managed to win, though with a reduced margin.306 
Regardless of how often interest groups succeed in their efforts, the 
increasing coarseness of judicial elections gives incumbent judges reason to 
worry that they might be the next target. This in turn increases the hazards to 
judicial independence and fuels calls for reforming campaign speech or 
replacing judicial elections with some type of appointive system.307 This article 
has tried to show that the problems involved are not likely to get fixed simply 
by tinkering with the rules. The law might not be only about politics, but it 
certainly is partly about politics. This reality cannot be escaped no matter how 
hard it is tried. 
sympathy with the administration than either ofthe others. Agnew skewered Goodell so badly 
that he gained enough votes at Ottinger's expense from outraged liberals and moderates that 
Buckley managed to squeak through to victory. See generally MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE 
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1972, at 509-.10, 512-13; JULES WITCOVER, WHITE KNIGHT: 
THE RISE OF SPIRO AGNEW 372-80, 387-88, 393-94 {1972); Irving Roshwalb & Leonard 
Resnicoff, The Impact of Endorsements and Publishe{i Polls on the 1970 New York Senatorial 
Election, 35 PUB. OP. Q. 410 (1971). 
305 For example, the architect ofthe anti-Resnick campaign in Ohio expressed no regrets 
and promised more such efforts in future years. Larkin, supra note 300; Paul Souhrada, 
Resnick Revels in Getting the Last Laugh, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 2000, at D 1. Interest 
groups have been gearing up for what might be an even more costly judicial election in 2002. 
David Bennett, Courtin the Balance, CRAIN'S CLEV. Bus., Jan. 28, 2002, at I. 
306 Reid, supra note 6, at 74-75. 
307 See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 3. 
